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Abstract
The quantum-mechanical description of the world, including hu-
man observers, makes substantial use of entanglement. In order to
understand this, we need to adopt concepts of truth, probability and
time which are unfamiliar in modern scientific thought. There are
two kinds of statements about the world: those made from inside the
world, and those from outside. The conflict between contradictory
statements which both appear to be true can be resolved by recognis-
ing that they are made in different perspectives. Probability, in an
objective sense, belongs in the internal perspective, and to statements
in the future tense. Such statements obey a many-valued logic, in
which the truth values are identified as probabilities.
Introduction
There is nothing new or surprising in the idea that quantum theory has
philosophical implications. The theory itself, in its commonest formulation,
was shaped by the philosophical predilections of Bohr and Heisenberg, and in
turn was used by them to support their philosophical ideas. However, these
ideas, positivist and instrumentalist in tendency, discouraged any attempt to
take quantum mechanics literally, and had the effect of restricting its scope
to microscopic phenomena. In Bohr’s famous words, “There is no quantum
world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think
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that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what
we can say about nature” [1]. But as quantum predictions are confirmed for
larger and larger objects, this metaphysical restraint comes to look less and
less satisfactory; it becomes ever more tempting to believe that there is a
quantum world, and that it is the whole world, including ourselves. It then
becomes necessary to confront the philosophical problem “How can the world
be as described by quantum theory?” In particular, how can we understand
entanglement as a real feature of the world? This question, I will argue,
teaches us philosophical lessons about some of our basic concepts: truth,
probability, time and chance.
By “the world as described by quantum theory” I mean a world that is
associated with a single vector in Hilbert space, changing in time according
to the Schro¨dinger equation, and changing only in that way. This is (at
least part of) the Everett-Wheeler interpretation of quantum mechanics, but
it remains a partial description until some kind of meaning is given to the
universal state vector. Notoriously, the Everett-Wheeler interpretation has
problems in incorporating probability; possibly less notorious, but no less
serious, are problems associated with the past and the future which were
pointed out by Bell [2]. Accepting the universal quantum description, with
its essential feature of entanglement, requires hard thought about probability
and the future. These are already mysterious enough; but I will suggest that
quantum mechanics provides a framework which helps with the old myster-
ies. In addition, in order to make sense of entanglement in the quantum
description of the whole universe, including ourselves and our thoughts and
beliefs, we will need to examine what we mean by truth.
Schro¨dinger’s Cat
We are celebrating the 75th anniversary of Schro¨dinger’s paper [3] in which
he named and discussed the concept of entanglement, emphasising its respon-
sibility for the strangeness of the world revealed by quantum mechanics. The
concept itself, of course, is older than this; it played a central role in von Neu-
mann’s 1932 analysis of measurement [4] as well as the EPR paper of 1935 to
which Schro¨dinger was responding [5], and its essential features were already
recognised in Weyl’s textbook of 1928 [6]. However, it is Schro¨dinger’s paper
that brings entanglement to the centre of the stage.
That same paper contains the famous example of Schro¨dinger’s cat, which
is often presented as an argument against quantum mechanics (though this
is not how Schro¨dinger intended it). When the unfortunate cat has been
in Schro¨dinger’s diabolical device for a time t, the crude argument goes,
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quantum mechanics predicts that its state is of the form
|ψcat(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉+
√
1− e−2γt|dead〉 (1)
So why don’t we see such superpositions of live and dead cats? I repeat,
this is not Schro¨dinger’s question: he devised this example to show that
superposition could not be understood as a kind of smearing out or jellifica-
tion of the individual terms in the superposition. Indeed, the answer to this
question is implicit in Schro¨dinger’s discussion of entanglement later in the
paper. Quantum mechanics does not predict that we will see the state (1);
if we are watching the cat, hoping to see a superposition like the above, the
interaction by which we see it actually produces the entangled state
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉cat|  ⌣〉observer +
√
1− e−2γt|dead〉cat|  ⌢〉observer (2)
in which |  ⌣〉 is the observer state of seeing a live cat and |  ⌢〉 is the state
of seeing a dead cat. Nowhere in this total state is there an observer seeing
a superposition of a live and a dead cat.
But then, what does this state tell us about the cat and the observer?
What is Truth?
If the observer is watching the cat continuously over the period from time 0
to time t, they will be able to note the time, if any, at which they see the cat
die. Then the joint state of the cat and the observer is something like
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−γt|alive〉cat|“The cat is alive”〉observer
+
∫ t′
0
e−γt
′ |dead〉cat|“I saw the cat die at time t′”〉observerdt′ (3)
in which the observer states contain propositions which are physically en-
coded in the brain of the observer. But what is their status as propositions;
are they true or false? Each is believed by a brain which has observed the
fact it describes, and that fact belongs to reality. As a human belief, each
statement could not be more true. Yet they cannot all be true, for they
contradict each other.
This conflict shows the necessity of considering the context in which a
statement is made when discussing its truth value. When this is done, it
becomes possible for contradictory statements to be simultaneously true,
each in its own context.
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Internal vs. External
In general, the state of the universe can be expanded in terms of the states
of any observer inside the universe as
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉
where the |ηn〉 form an orthonormal basis of observer states, which we can
take to be eigenstates of definite experience; the |Φn(t)〉 are the correspond-
ing states of the rest of the universe at time t. The actual observer can only
experience being in one of the states |ηn〉 (because they exhaust all possible
experiences), and in this state it is true for the observer that the only expe-
rience they have is ηn; the observer is justified, at time t, in deducing that
the rest of the universe is in the unique state |Φn(t)〉. This is the internal
truth relative to the experience state |ηn〉.
But there is also the external truth that the state of the whole universe is
|Ψ(t)〉. From this standpoint all the experiences ηn truly occur. Thus there
are the following two types of truth involved.
External truth: The truth about the universe is given by a state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 in a Hilbert space HU , evolving according to the Schro¨dinger equation.
If the Hilbert space can be factorised as
HU = HS ⊗HE
where HS contains states of an experiencing observer, then
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉
and all the states |ηn〉 for which |Φn(t)〉 6= 0 describe experiences which
actually occur at time t.
Internal truth from the perspective |ηn〉: I actually have experience ηn,
which tells me that the rest of the universe is in the state |Φn(t)〉. This is an
objective fact; everybody I have talked to agrees with me.
Compatibilism
This distinction between internal and external truth is a special case of a gen-
eral opposition which was introduced and carefully discussed by the philoso-
pher Thomas Nagel [7]. He used it to discuss a number of longstanding
conflicts in philosophy, including
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1. The existence of space-time vs the passage of time;
2. Determinism vs free will;
3. The physical description of brain states vs conscious experience;
4. Duty vs “Why should I?”
These are all contradictions between pairs of statements or principles, both
of which we seem to have good reason to believe. In every case one of the
statements is a general universal statement — what Nagel [7] calls “a view
from nowhere” — to which assent seems to be compelled by scientific inves-
tigation or moral reflection; the other is a matter of immediate experience,
seen from inside the universe (a view from “now here”).
Scientists might be tempted to exalt the external statement as the ob-
jective truth, downgrading internal statements as merely subjective. Indeed,
Nagel himself uses the terminology of “objective” and “subjective”. But he
does not use a dismissive qualifier like “merely” to denigrate the subjective:
he is at pains to emphasise that the truth of an internal statement has a
vividness and immediacy, resulting from the fact that it is actually expe-
rienced, compared to which external truth is “bleached-out”. This applies
most obviously in contexts like ethics and aesthetics, but we would do well
to remember it in our scientific context; as I have pointed out above, it is the
internal statement which has the scientific justification of being supported
by evidence, and is objective in the usual sense that it is empirical and is
agreed by all observers who can communicate with each other.
But the situation is more complicated than this might suggest. It is not
that there is a God-like being who can survey the whole universe and make
statements about the universal state vector, distinct from us physical beings
who are trapped in one component of |Ψ〉. It is we physical beings who make
statements about |Ψ〉, for good theoretical reasons, from our situation in
which we experience just the one component |ηn〉|Φn〉. From that perspective,
what are we to make of the other components |ηm〉|Φm〉?
“+” = “and” or “or” or “ ‘and’ and ‘or’ ”?
Consider a measurement process, in which an initial state |Ψ(0)〉 = |η0〉|Φ0(0)〉,
containing only one experience |η0〉, develops in time t to an entangled state
|Ψ(t)〉 =∑ |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉. The external statement is:
|Ψ(t)〉 represents a true statement about the universe, and all
its components are real.
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The observer who experiences only |ηn〉 must say:
I know that only |ηn〉 is real (because I experience only that),
and therefore |Φn(t)〉 represents a true statement about the rest
of the universe. But I also know that |Ψ(t)〉 is true (because I’ve
calculated it). The other |ηm〉|Φm〉 represent things that might
have happened but didn’t.
These statements are font-coded, using bold type for internal (vivid, expe-
rienced) judgements, and italic for external (pale, theoretical) ones, even
though these are made by an internal observer.
It is a constant temptation in physics, on finding a quantum system in a
superposition |φ〉+|ψ〉, to think that it is either in the state |φ〉 or in the state
|ψ〉. This, after all, is the upshot when we look at the result of an experiment.
Despite the stern warnings of our lecturers when we are learning the subject,
and the proof from the two-slit experiment that “+” cannot mean “or”, we all
probably slip into this way of thinking at times; and the common-sense view
of Schro¨dinger’s cat seems to justify it. On the other hand, the many-worlds
view insists that both terms in the superposition are real, and therefore “+”
means “and”. What I am suggesting here is that both “and” and “or” are
valid interpretations of “+” in different contexts: “and” in the external view,
“or” in the internal view.
How Many Worlds?
The foregoing needs some refinement. Quantum superposition is not just
a single binary operation “+” on states, but is modified by coefficients:
a|φ〉 + b|ψ〉 is a weighted superposition of the (normalised) states |φ〉 and
|ψ〉. In interpreting “+” as “or”, it is easy to incorporate this weighting
of the disjuncts by interpreting it in terms of probability. But if we inter-
pret “+” as “and”, as in the many-worlds interpretation, what can it mean
to weight the conjuncts? Let us look back to the paradigmatic geometrical
meaning of vector addition. “Going north-east” is the vector sum of “go-
ing north” and “going east”, and does indeed mean going north and going
east at the same time. But “going NNE” also means going north and going
east at the same time; only there is more going north than going east. So
if a superposition a|φ〉 + b|ψ〉 of macroscopic states |φ〉 and |ψ〉 means that
both |φ〉 and ψ〉 are real in different worlds, we must accept that they are
not “equally real”, as is often carelessly stated (see, for example, the blurb
of [8]), but that they are real to different extents |a|2 and |b|2. Adding up
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these degrees of reality, we then find that there are not many worlds but
(|a|2 + |b|2 =) one.
Another argument for this conclusion uses the physical observable of
particle number. The many-worlds view regards the state vector |Ψ(t)〉 =∑
n |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉 as describing many (say N) worlds, with N different copies
of the observer having the different experiences |ηn〉. Suppose the observer’s
name is Alice. There is an observable called Alice number, of which each of
the states |ηn〉|Φ(t)〉 is an eigenstate with eigenvalue 1. Then Ψ(t)〉 is also
an eigenstate of Alice number with eigenvalue 1 (not N). There is only one
Alice.
Collapse
The observer in this measurement process might go on to say:
I saw a transition from |η1〉 to |ηn〉 at some time t′ < t. But
I know that |Ψ(t′)〉 didn’t collapse. The other |ηm〉|Φm〉 might
come back and interfere with me in the future; but this has very
low probability.
This shows how the conflicting statements about time development in the
Everett-Wheeler and Copenhagen interpretations can after all be compatible.
The continuous Schro¨dinger-equation evolution postulated by the Everett-
Wheeler interpretation refers to the external view; the collapses postulated
by the Copenhagen interpretation refer to the internal view, i.e. to what we
actually see. The occurrence of collapse becomes a theorem rather than a
postulate (conjecturally — more on this later). We also see that it is only
the internal statement that mentions probability. But what does it mean?
’
What is Probability?
The meaning of probability is a long-standing philosophical problem (see, for
example, [9]). It seems likely that there are in fact several distinct concepts
which go by the name of probability, sharing only the fact that they obey the
same mathematical axioms. The clearest of these, perhaps, is degree of belief,
which has the advantage that it can be defined operationally: someone’s
degree of belief in a proposition is equal to the odds that they are prepared
to offer in a bet that the proposition is true. The subjective nature of this
concept seems to chime with the fact that it belongs in internal statements, as
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we have just seen, and indeed similar views of probability are often adopted
by Everettians even though their general stance is objectivist.
However, we have also seen that “internal” should not be equated with
“subjective”, and our experience in a quantum-mechanical world seems to
require a description in terms of objective chance. Things happen randomly,
but with definite probabilities that cannot be reduced to our beliefs. The
value of the half-life of uranium 238 is a fact about the world, not a mere
consequence of someone’s belief.
Such objective probability can only refer to future events.
Probability and the Future
What kinds of statements can be made at time t about some future time
s > t, if the universal state vector is known to be |Ψ(t)〉 and its decomposition
with respect to experience states of a particular observer is
∑
n |ηn〉|Φn(t)〉?
From the external perspective, the future state |Ψ(s)〉 is determined by the
Schro¨dinger equation and there is no question of any probability. From the
internal perspective relative to an experience state |ηn〉, there is a range of
possible future states |ηm〉, and probabilities must enter into the statement
of what the future state will be. But here is a fundamental problem: there is
no such thing as what the future state will be. As Bell pointed out, quantum
mechanics gives no connection between a component of |Ψ〉 at one time and
any component at another time; so what is it that we can assign probabilities
to? How can “the probability that my state will be |ηm〉 tomorrow” mean
anything when “my state will be |ηm〉 tomorrow” has no meaning?
The Classical Future
This puzzle takes us back to ways of thinking that are much older than
quantum mechanics, indeed older than all of modern science. The success of
Newtonian deterministic physics has led us to assume that there always is a
definite future, and even when we drop determinism we tend to continue in
the same assumption. There is a future, even if we do not and cannot know
what it will be. But this was not what Aristotle believed, and maybe it is
not what we believed when we were children.
Aristotle, in a famous passage [10], considered the proposition “There
will be a sea-battle tomorrow”. He argued that this proposition is neither
true nor false (otherwise we are forced into fatalism). Thus he rejected the
law of excluded middle for future-tense statements, implying that they obey
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a many-valued logic. Modern logicians [11] have considered the possibility of
a third truth-value in addition to “true” or “false”, namely u for “undeter-
mined”, for future-tense statements. But, interestingly, Aristotle admitted
that the sea-battle might be more or less likely to take place. This suggests
that the additional truth values needed for future-tense statements are not
limited to one, u, but can be any real number between 0 and 1 and should
be identified with the probability that the statement will come true. Turning
this round gives us an objective form of probability which applies to future
events, or to propositions in the future tense; in a slogan,
Probability = degree of truth.
Probabilities as Truth Values
This translation of Aristotle’s position seems so natural that it has surely
been developed already. However, I have been unable to find it in the litera-
ture of probability theory, temporal logic or many-valued logic. The notion
of “degree of truth” occurs in fuzzy logic and philosophical discussions of
vagueness (for a critical account see [12]), but seems to have been little used
in the philosophy of probability. In an early paper [13] (earlier than what are
generally regarded as the first papers on many-valued logic)  Lukasiewicz in-
troduced truth values between 0 and 1 and equated them with probabilities,
but in a different sense from that of quantum mechanics. He was search-
ing for a notion of objective probability, but found it only in propositions
containing a free variable; this is the concept of probability used by number
theorists, for example, who might consider the probability that a number in
an arithmetic progression is prime.  Lukasiewicz rejected any application to
future-tense statements with no free variables, to which he thought proba-
bility did not apply because at this time (1913) he believed in determinism.
Reichenbach [14] interpreted probability as a truth value, though because he
held a frequentist view of probability, his truth values were properties of se-
quences of propositions rather than single propositions.  Lukasiewicz defined
the [0, 1]-valued truth value of a proposition with a variable in terms of the
(two-valued) truth or falsity of the singular propositions obtained by sub-
stituting individuals for the variable; Reichenbach defined the [0, 1]-valued
truth value of a sequence of propositions in terms of the two-valued truth
or falsity of the propositions in the sequence. Here it is proposed that the
[0, 1]-valued truth value of a future-tense proposition is a primitive property
of that proposition, not reducible to any truth values in two-valued logic.
Truth values are also equated with probabilities in the topos theory ap-
proach to quantum mechanics developed by Isham and Doering [15]; in their
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work the concept of probability is stretched to fit a concept of truth value
already existing in many-valued logic (in particular, it is no longer a number
in the interval [0, 1]). Here, on the other hand, it is proposed to adapt the
concept of truth value to fit the pre-existing concept of probability. Two
aspects of this adaptation particularly need to be pointed out.
First, truth values are usually assumed to have the property that logical
connectives like ∧ (and) and ∨ (or) are “truth-functional”, i.e. the truth
values of p∧ q and p∨ q are determined by those of p and q. The probability
of a compound statement, however, is constrained but not determined by the
probabilities of its constituents: for the probabilities of p ∧ q and p ∨ q we
only have inequalities
P (p), P (q) ≥ P (p ∧ q) ≥ 1− P (p)− P (q),
P (p), P (q) ≤ P (p ∨ q) ≤ P (p) + P (q).
Although degrees of truth for vague statements are usually assumed to be
truth-functional, some authors have argued that they should behave like
probabilities, as above ([16]; see also [12]). Reichenbach proposed to solve
this problem by increasing the number of arguments in the truth tables. The
truth value of a compound proposition formed from p and q is a function, not
only of the truth values of p and q, but also of a third value, corresponding
to the conditional probability of p given q. This amounts to recognising the
truth value of p ∧ q as an independent variable.
A second departure from the usual properties of truth values is that the
probability of a proposition referring to a future time s depends not only on
the proposition itself (taking the time s to be a part of the proposition), but
also on the time t at which the proposition is considered. For an observer
experiencing the state |ηn〉 at time t, the probability of experiencing ηm〉 at
a future time s is ∣∣(〈ηm|〈Φm(s)|) e−iH(s−t)/ℏ (|ηn〉|Φn(t)〉)∣∣2
〈Φm(s)|Φm(s)〉〈Φn(t)|Φn(t)〉 . (4)
Thus our account of probability requires that the truth value of the propo-
sition “My experience at time s will be |ηm〉” depends on the time at which
the proposition is uttered. Such dependence on a context of utterance is
nothing new (consider the truth value of the proposition “it is raining”), but
that can usually be understood as being because the context of utterance is
needed to fill in an incomplete proposition (in our example, it provides the
time and place at which it is raining). There is no such incompleteness in
the case of the above proposition. We therefore require a framework of time-
dependent truth values, which is recognised in the Stanford Encyclopaedia
of Philosophy as “the tensed view of semantics” [17].
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The Truth of the Past
The classical position (in classical philosophy, if not classical physics) would
be that propositions referring to the past and present are either true or false;
it is only the future that is uncertain. Thus if P (s, t) is the truth value at t
of a proposition referring to time s, we should have
0 ≤ P (s, t) ≤ 1 if s > t,
P (s, t) = 0 or 1 if s ≤ t. (5)
It is not clear whether this can or should be maintained in quantum theory.
Bell’s point [2] about the lack of connection between experience states at
different times applies to the past as much as the future. We do have an
empirical warrant for our past states, as we do not for future states, in the
form of memory, which is not symmetric under time reversal. This has yet
to be modelled quantum-mechanically, but hopefully it can be shown that
there is a physical process which leaves a record in the state at one time
of a sequence of states in the past, and that this record is consistent with
the probabilities (4). Maybe it would go further and establish transition
probabilities such as have been postulated for modal interpretations [18, 19].
If so, this might provide justification for truth values satisfying (5).
Even if this could be established as a feature of quantum systems with
memory, the theory would still be vulnerable to Bell’s charge of temporal
solipsism: a memory state is still a present state, and does not constitute a
genuine past. Markosian [20] has pointed out that this openness of the past
is an inevitable consequence of time-reversal symmetry in a theory with an
open future.
The Open Future
We find it hard, in a scientific theory, to accommodate the idea that there is
no definite future. To be sure, we have indeterministic theories in which the
future is not uniquely determined by the past, but such stochastic theories
deal with complete histories encompassing past, present and future; prob-
abilities refer to which of these histories is actual. Indeterminism, in the
usual stochastic formulation, consists of the fact that there are many such
histories containing a given past up to a certain time, so the future extension
is not unique; but the underlying assumption is that only one of these future
histories is real, so that the future is fixed even though it is not determined.
In contrast, the formulation of quantum mechanics outlined here — or what
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Bell [2] called the “Everett (?) theory” — is, I think, the only form of sci-
entific theory in which the future is genuinely open. Unlike Bell, I do not
regard this as a problem for the theory; it tells a truth which we should be
glad to recognise. The function of the theory is to provide a catalogue of pos-
sibilities and specify how these change (deterministically) with time; it does
not and cannot say which of the possibilities is actualised at any time. The
“measurement problem” of quantum theory is no more than the difficulty of
accepting this format for a scientific theory; with a change of gestalt, we can
see it as a natural way to formulate indeterminism.
However, I must emphasise the roles that entanglement and the concept of
internal truth play in this resolution of the measurement problem. Without
these, there would be a “preferred basis” problem: if the universal wave func-
tion is a catalogue of possibilities, what basis defines the components which
are to be regarded as possibilities? But there is no preferred-basis problem in
this understanding of the Everett-Wheeler interpretation. The possibilities
are given by experience states, which only exist if the universal Hilbert state
has a tensor product structure in which one of the factors describes a system
capable of experience, i.e. which has a basis of states exhibiting the structure
of propositions describing experience. It is not required that this basis should
be unique; it is in principle possible that the same factor Hilbert space might
have a different basis also showing the structure of a (totally different) set of
experiences. It is also in principle possible that the universal Hilbert space
has more than one tensor product structure with the required properties. If
this should be so, statements about these different experiences would also
be (internally) true, relative to these different structures; this would not de-
tract from the truth of the original experience propositions. Both kinds of
internal proposition would be compatible with the external truth of the same
universal state vector.
Summary: The lessons of entanglement
I conclude with a set of slogans.
• There are different kinds of truth. We must distinguish external and
internal truth.
• The logic of future-tense statements is many-valued.
• Probability = degree of truth.
• Entanglement captures indeterminism.
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